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 use subThe plethora of pathways leading to family formation decisions has
made the causal assessment of the inﬂuence of politics and religion
on marriage and fertility difﬁcult. The authors exploit the unique op-
portunity offered by the emergence of a new political party in Turkey,
and the electoral features of the country’s majoritarian system, to es-
timate the effect of politics and religion on marriage and fertility. The
AK Parti (Justice andDevelopment Party), with an explicitly Islamist
platform, won Turkish elections in 2002, taking both a pro-natalist
and pro-family stance, with increasing welfare expenditures and an
explicit neoliberal agenda on macroeconomic issues. The authors an-
alyze the results of the 2004 local elections using a regression discon-
tinuity design and show that fertility and marriage rates have been
signiﬁcantly higher in districts where the AK Parti won. They argue
that increased local welfare provision is the main explanatory mech-
anism, also discussing other alternative and complementary mecha-
nisms.Marriage and fertility are crucial ingredients of social reproduction. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, they have long occupied a central role in political dis-
course and have at times become the direct aim of political action througharticle beneﬁted from comments at the 2016AlpPop and Population Association of
ca Conferences and seminars at Linköping (Institute for Analytical Sociology),
g (Sociology), Oxford (Nufﬁeld College), and the University of California, Los An-
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Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertility“population policy” or “family policy.” Teitelbaum deﬁned strategic demog-
raphy as the active deployment of fertility as national policy (2015). Strategic
demography has been adopted by several conservative political parties (and
governments), many of which have an explicit religious ideology. Still, pro-
natalism has roots that are generally seen as more progressive, such as in the
crafting of a “democratic family and population policy” byMyrdal (1941) as
a foundation for the modern Swedish welfare state.
A central issue in triggering pro-natalism is the fear of population decline as
a consequence of decliningmarriage and low fertility (Teitelbaum andWinter
1985). This fear is not novel. Almost a century ago, Thompson (1929) identi-
ﬁed a group of countries facing population decline as a consequence of below-
replacement fertility. Thompson’s approach was not intellectually isolated.
Although not always aware of one another’s work, several scholars from dif-
ferent countries published bleak views of population decline before World
War II and before the formulation of the idea of a demographic transition
by Notestein (1945; Kirk 1996). The more recent emergence of sustained
below-replacement fertility in several societies has contributed to producing
a second wave in this debate (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; McDonald
2006; Morgan and Taylor 2006; Marshall 2015). Religion has been seen as
holding a central role in the politics of “family decline” (Brooks 2002). Asmar-
riage, fertility, policies, and religion are evolving together, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd
evidence on their mutual effects. To what extent do politics and religion
shape marriage and fertility trends? We address these questions by focusing
on what Merton (1987) called a strategic research site: Turkey at the begin-
ning of the 21st century.
Turkey epitomizes the centrality of the links among religion, politics, pol-
icies, and marriage and fertility. During the 20th century, a series of succes-
sive governments implemented amodernization agenda, with an explicit em-
phasis on both economic development and secularization, following the basic
tenets of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This
agenda included the reduction of gender inequalities. Turkey’s fertility de-
cline has been consistentwith standard theories on family and fertility changegeles (California Center for Population Research). We thank Evrim Altintaş, Richard
Breen, DuncanGallie, NanDirk deGraaf, JohnGoldthorpe, PatrickHeuveline, Jennifer
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All(Cleland andWilson 1987;Kirk 1996), and the replacement levelwas reached
in the early 2000s.However, the results of the 2002Turkish political elections
marked a political, and religious, turning point. In these elections, the AK
Parti and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won on a platform that has em-
phasized Islamism and used political discourse in defense of traditional fam-
ily and fertility values. During the following decade, the AK Parti’s platform
translated into political actions, including, as we will see more in detail, pro-
marriage and pro-natalistwelfare policies deployed at the local level, in away
that is consistent with the party’s simultaneously neoliberal and religious
platform. This wave of policies has been deﬁned by Altıok (2013) as “repro-
ductive governmentality,” echoingTeitelbaum’s notion of strategic demogra-
phy. Under AK Parti’s rule, local welfare provision has been expanded, and
this expansionwas starker in the areas inwhich itﬁrst came into power.After
2002, fertility decline has stalled and subsequently even slightly reversed.
This reversal has clear political signiﬁcance, as we discuss in the next section.
In 2015, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) emphatically announced
that fertility had climbed back again above the replacement level in the pre-
vious year (a total fertility rate of 2.17 in 2014).2
In this article, we build three data sets onTurkey by linking electoral (and
socioeconomic) data at the local level with family and fertility outcomes.We
then exploit the features of Turkey’s electoral system to apply a regression
discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the impact ofAKParti rule onTurkish
marriage and fertility behavior. Themajoritarian features of theTurkish elec-
tion system allow us to use RDD (Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960; Imbens
and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010) to compare districts that at the
margin only differ by the ruling party, as a natural experiment. RDDhas very
favorable properties, which allow for a clear identiﬁcation of causal effects.
Despite these favorable properties, RDDs are still underutilized in sociology
(Gangl 2010). Using RDD, we are able to document the causal effect of a local-
level turning point, the AK Parti’s rise in power, on marriage and fertility.
Our results are generally consistent across the three data sets.
We ﬁnd that AK Parti’s rule has the effect to increase (or to halt the de-
crease of ) marriage and fertility rates. As our preferred explanation on the
effects of politics and religion on marriage and fertility in Turkey runs
through the provision of local welfare, we also test the potential heterogene-
ity of causal effects, showing that the effect on fertility is larger in poorer re-
gions. We test for the effects of alternative and complementary causal path-“While the total fertility rate was 2.10 children according to the revised 2013 data, this
ate was 2.17 children in 2014. It means that a woman gave approximately 2.17 live
irths during her reproductive life. This case showed that the replacement level of fertil-
y was exceeded” (Turkish Statistical Institute, press release no. 18621, April 17, 2015;
ee http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?idp18621). Still, vast heterogene-






This content downloaded from 128.041.061.032 on May 23, 2018 10:19:10 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilityways, running througheconomicdevelopment, religion-basedchanges inmar-
riage and fertility preferences, immigration, and infant mortality.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We ﬁrst discuss our
strategic research site, Turkey, illustrating both general societal and political
change up to the end of the 21st century and changes, including policies, in-
troduced during the ﬁrst period of AK Parti’s rule. This leads us to formulat-
ing ourmain testable hypotheses, that is, that AKParti’s rule had the effect of
increasing (or halting the decrease of) marriage and fertility in areas inwhich
it ﬁrst came into power and that this effect is mainly linked to the increased
provision of welfare at the local level. We then introduce the RDD method
and the data and measures we use. After presenting the results of our anal-
yses, and discussing alternative and complementary mechanisms, we then
conclude by summarizing our contributions and discussing our key ﬁndings.TURKEY CIRCA BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Turkey has gone through state-controlled processes of secularization and
modernization since its inception, in 1923. Describing Turkey’s moderniza-
tion process at the end of the 1950s, Bellah (1958) emphasized the relevance
of Ziya Gökalp (a sociologist of Durkheimian inﬂuence) in shaping the
“Kemalist” project (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was Turkey’s ﬁrst president,
until his death in 1938). Gökalp championed Turkish nationalism as the
cultural foundation for the new Turkey, as “the referent for all symbols of
ultimate value in society itself” (Bellah 1958, p. 3). Family issues were cen-
tral, as one would expect given the Durkheimian framework, in this nation-
alistic modernization process (Kavas and Thornton 2013). The geopolitical
role of Turkey as a “bridge” between Europe and the Middle East pushed
the country to join North Atlantic Treaty Organziation in 1952, and its eco-
nomic development was recognized as early as 1962, when Turkey joined
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Three in-
terrelated developments at the beginning of the 21st century make the
Turkish case a strategic one for our purposes: the end of the fertility transi-
tion, the end of the state-controlled modernization process and the rise to
power of the Islamist AK Parti, and the development of explicit welfare-
based pro-natalist and pro-marriage policies deployed at the local level con-
sistent with the religious inspiration of the AK Parti.
First, Turkey reached the end of its fertility transition at the end of the
20th century, with the total fertility rate reaching the replacement level in
2003, despite previous accounts thatmentionedTurkey as a case of a fertility
transition “stalled” around a rate of 2.5 (Bongaarts 2006).3 Still, fertility differ-3 Fertility rate data available from TurkStat, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Prelstatistik
Tablo.do?istab_idp1592; accessed December 21, 2017.
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Allentials estimated through Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for
2008–13 reﬂect traditional heterogeneity, with strong regional and rural/ur-
ban differences, as well as differences with respect to education and wealth
(Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies 2014). Again using
DHS, an indicator of “total wanted fertility” that excludes unwanted chil-
dren locates desired fertility at 1.9 children per woman (as opposed to the
2.3 that is actually recorded for women who participated in the survey).
While indicators on fertility desires should not be directly taken as indicators
on the intentionality of reproduction (Johnson-Hanks 2007), theymight be in-
dicative of the convergence to values around replacement that is typical of
many Western societies (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2003). In particular,
there has been a substitution in the values attributed to children, from thema-
terial/economic dimension to the psychological dimension that is also typical
of posttransitional societies (Kagitcibasi and Ataca 2005). While during this
period age at ﬁrst marriage has shifted upward, marriage in Turkey remains
almost universal, with the proportion of women nevermarried by age 45–49
at most 3% in 2013 (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
2014).
Second, after decades of explicitly state-led secularization,Turkey shifted to
an elected government runby theAKParti, which emerged froma tradition of
Islamic-oriented parties that had challenged the secular nature of previous
governments (Mecham 2004; Özbudun 2006). The victory of the AK Parti
was not completely unexpected, as the Kemalist modernization project con-
tributed to the creation of an urbanized secular cleavage, with a vast majority
of the population remaining poor andmarginalized (Yavuz 1997, 2000). Polit-
ical Islam gained power among the excluded cleavages with its “prosperity
maximization/democracy” discourse (Yavuz 1997; Turan 2007). While the
state-controlled modernization process had been challenged by a prosperity
maximization/democracy paradigm pushed by religiously motivated politi-
cal movements, it has been restored through several military interventions
(Turan 2007). The AK Parti’s victory in the 2002 general elections, right af-
ter the 2001 economic crisis, signaled the end of state-controlled moderniza-
tion—ourmain turning point. This revival of political Islamwas in fact, and
quite remarkably, predicted by Bellah more than half a century earlier: “it is
too soon to say that it [the differentiation between the levels of religion in
Turkey and social ideology] has been entirely accomplished” (1958, p. 2).
Third, the government has openly adopted pro-natalist and pro-marriage
views—a clear step toward “strategic demography.”Historically, Turkey fol-
lowed pro-natalist policies between 1923 and 1960 (Yüksel 2013). The found-
ing of the State Planning Organization, after the 1960 military coup, marked
a policy turn. All of the ﬁve-year plans from 1960 to 2007 stressed the control
of population growth as a means to facilitate economic development (Yüksel
2013). The Ninth Development Plan prepared under the rule of the AKParti1300
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Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilityfor 2007–13 was a turning point, mentioning for the ﬁrst time challenges re-
lated to reproductive health and population aging and calling explicitly for a
return to pro-natalist policies. In particular, the prospects of population aging
contributed to driving this agenda. In 2012,AmbassadorApakan, the perma-
nent representative of Turkey to theUnitedNations inNewYork, depicted a
grim picture of fast population aging in emerging economies and developing
countries, as Turkey was shown as the “second-fastest aging country in the
world.”4 The main leader of AK Parti, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his roles
as prime minister and president of Turkey made explicit pro-natalist and pro-
marriage remarks. In2009, hedeclared: “Every family shouldhaveat least three
children, before it is too late. Themorewe grow, the stronger wewill become,
be assured.”5 In 2014 he stated, “Don’t delay marriage. While you are study-
ing, or as soon as you graduate, take care of it. Don’t be too picky, if you are
too picky, youwill leave the rose garden empty-handed,”6 and “Weneed this
(a younger population) to take Turkey above the level of modern civiliza-
tions. In this country opponents have been engaged in the treason of birth
control for years and sought to dry up our generation.”7 AKParti’s approach
has not only been mere political rhetoric. Since 2002, the government has
launched a wave of social and economic assistance, explicitly targeting mar-
ginalized families, young couples, mothers, and children (Metin 2011). Finally
in January 2015, the AKParti announced a newProgram for the Protection of
the Family andDynamic Population Structure. The program includes several
incentives and policies aimed to increase fertility and facilitate a baby boom
(Yüksel 2013).
The roots ofAKParti’s strong pro-natalist stance can be found inTurkey’s
traditional political Islam, particularlyNecmettin Erbakan’sNational Order
Party (MNP). The MNP was founded in 1970 as Turkey’s ﬁrst explicitly Is-
lamist political party and was shut down by the constitutional court in 1971
following the military coup in the same year. TheMNP strongly opposed the
anti-natalist population policies of the 1960s. TheMNP saw those policies as
a product of an “international conspiracy” that ultimately aimed to “morally
invade” the country by “stunting its national development” (Güriz 1971,4 See http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Apakan-Intro-and-Comments
.pdf (October 10, 2009).
5 See https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-is-isten-gecmeden-en-az-3-cocuk,ZE
QhCeWHVkS061EDhd72Ng (October 10, 2009; in Turkish).
6 See http://t24.com.tr/haber/evliligi-geciktirmeyin-turgev-bu-konuda-cok-iyi-bir-ihtisas
-alani,264790 (July 18, 2014; in Turkish) and http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/11/26
/turkish-president-erdogans-sexist-remarks-reinforces-prejudices-against-women/ (Novem-
ber 26, 2014; in English).
7 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/president-erdogan-at-couples
-wedding-birth-control-is-treason-to-growth-of-turkey-9944286.html (December 22, 2014).
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Allp.35).8 TheMNP’s conspiratorial discourse and its view that links strong pro-
natalism with nationalist and Islamic motives bear a striking resemblance to
the Erdoğan’s quotes above. The main political opposition, the center-left
secular Republican People’s Party (CHP), remains a strong defender of the
pre–AK Parti anti-natalist population policies. For example, the CHP party
program proposes to increase the number of health professionals specialized
in family planning, particularly in rural areas, as a means to control and as-
sess the socioeconomic effects of population growth.9 The second largest op-
position force, the far rightNationalistMovement Party (MHP), has historically
opposed the 1960s population control policies (Güriz 1971). However, recent
party programs of the MHP are rather silent on population issues, as they do
not propose any explicit pro- or anti-natalist policies. Hence, the AK Parti’s
strong pro-natalist turn marks not only a historical shift in population poli-
cies that the central government has embraced but also a divergence from the
contemporary views of non-Islamist opposition parties.
To understand the effects of these simultaneous changes, it is essential to go
beyond the national level. In particular, the initial heterogeneity of marriage
and fertility, whether the AK Parti is in power in a particular area, and the
ability to transmit pro-natalist and pro-marriage policies at the local level
are powerful factors that channel national-level change through the subna-
tional level.THE WELFARE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES
AND ORGANIZATIONS
Pro-natalism entered the political agenda as a national discourse during the
reign of the AK Parti. Yet, the channels through which the AK Parti could
inﬂuence reproductive behavior heavily involve local authorities and orga-
nizations, intertwining welfare policies and religious ideology. Erdoğan
himself linked religion and pro-natalism in an explicit way, as in his 2016
statement: “We need to increase the number of our descendants. People talk
about birth control, about family planning. No Muslim family can under-
stand and accept that! As God and as the great prophet said, we will go this
way. And in this respect the ﬁrst duty belongs tomothers.”10 This local prop-
agation of this national discourse has occurred chieﬂy through the combina-
tion of two parallel developments: a neoliberal agenda aiming at the reduc-
tion of the role of the central government in the welfare system and anSee Güriz (1971) for the MNP’s party program and a discussion.
For party programs, see https://www.ttb.org.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_parti_prog.pdf (in Turk-
h).
See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/30/family-planning-not-for-muslims-says





This content downloaded from 128.041.061.032 on May 23, 2018 10:19:10 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilityincrease in the role that charities controlled by local authorities play in wel-
fare provision.
Following the global trend started in the 1980s, and since gaining control
of the central government in 2002, the AK Parti has accelerated the adop-
tion of neoliberal-style socioeconomic policies (Buğra andKeyder 2006). In-
deed, the Islamic state-restructuring project of the AK Parti was also
shaped by the neoliberal agenda of the European Union, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank (Atasoy 2009). This neoliberal shift
implied a reduction in the central government’s role in providing basic so-
cial services and social security (Buğra and Keyder 2006; Celik 2010). Ex-
amples include labor market reforms (law 4857) that introduced ﬂexible
work schemes and a de-unionization of the workforce. Perhaps the most
telling example of this trend is the letter that the AK Parti penned to the In-
ternational Monetary Fund in 2005, stating its ultimate aim of reducing the
share of the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬁcit reserved for the social se-
curity system from 4.5% to only 1% (Celik 2010). This reduction in the cen-
tral government’s share in social expenditure has been counterbalanced by
the expansion of a local charity-based welfare system, which relies on phil-
anthropic and religious motives (Buğra and Keyder 2006; Celik 2010). In
this system, funds raised by local organizations and municipalities are used
to assist the poor and marginalized groups. Municipal governments have
played a crucial role in raising funds for welfare and in its provision (Metin
2011). It has been common for district mayors and other local authorities to
sit directly on the boards of trustees of social assistance and solidarity foun-
dations, the major players in the distribution of social assistance (Dodurka
2014).11 In fact, municipalities have served as brokers in charity, by chan-
neling funds provided by private donations. The sources of these donations
have often been unclear, and there is no reliable information at the district
level on the magnitude of funds used for assistance (Buğra and Keyder
2006). It is generally thought that themain body of donations has come from
private businesses that secure contracts frommunicipal governments (Celik
2010). This system has given municipal governments considerable discre-
tion, which has paved the way to potentially clientelist policies that have
distributed social assistance in a way that maximizes the chances of reelec-
tion of the governing party (Metin 2011; Aytaç 2014).
The local welfare system has been implemented in cooperation with the
central government. This agenda is explicit in the ofﬁcial program of the
AK Parti: “Our party will enable the cooperation of the central government
with local authorities,NGOs, and the private sector to increase the efﬁciency,11 See http://sosyalyardimlar.aile.gov.tr/sosyal-yardimlasma-ve-dayanisma-vakiﬂari
/sydvlerin-yapisi (in Turkish).
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Allspeed, and resource capacity of social welfare services.”12On the other side, as
the former minister of justice and former vice president of the AK Parti put
clearly, local authorities that do not “get along well with the central AK Parti
government had a hard time having their projects approved by Ankara.”13
This “synchronization” between local AKPartimunicipalities and the central
AK Parti government has given local AK Parti mayors a clear advantage
over their counterparts of opposition parties. Moreover, the AK Parti has a
strong tradition and experience in local government. As the prime example,
Erdoğan himself had served as themayor of Istanbul before founding theAK
Parti and becoming the prime minister.
Two additional important characteristics have given local governments
ruled by the AKParti an advantage inmobilizing and channeling initiatives
for welfare provision: an Islamic focus on motivation and mobilization and
a strong emphasis on the family as the prime target of the welfare system.
First, religious motivations have played a central role in welfare provision.
As an example, one of the most prominent nongovernmental organizations
in welfare has been Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), an organization that uses
Islamic values as primary motivations for charitable giving (Buğra and
Keyder 2006). Donations made to social assistance funds in districts con-
trolled by the AK Parti have been considered by most religiously motivated
donors as zekat, a periodic charitable payment required by the Islamic law
as one of the ﬁve pillars of Islam (Kocal 2014). The second important char-
acteristic of the welfare system is particularly relevant for our analysis: a
strong emphasis on the family. The ofﬁcial AK Parti program states: “if
the Turkish society is still intact after so many problems this is because of
our strong family structure.”14 According to the ﬁgures published by Turk-
Stat, since 2002 the funding for socioeconomic assistance has increased by
15 times, mainly due to this charity-based welfare system. Figure 1 shows
the increase in the share of funds spent for social assistance between 2002
and 2011 relative to the GDP. A substantial portion of this welfare assis-
tance has targeted families, mothers, young couples, and children. Mothers
have received conditional training and health related (e.g., pregnancy) aids,
to the extent of covering about 3 million children annually. Also, a premar-
riage training program has been implemented at the local level by AK Parti–
led municipalities. Between 2003 and 2013, 4.2 billion TL (approx. US$1.8
billion) have been spent for housing help toward poor families. In 2005, the
AK Parti also extended the coverage of a “green card,” which basically en-See sec. 5.1 para. 3 (in Turkish) at https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-prog
ami#bolum_ (accessed December 21, 2017).
See http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/11070235.asp (in Turkish).
AK Parti (2015) 2002 Genel Seçimleri Beyannamesi [2002 General Election Manifesto],
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Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilityables access to free health care for thosewithout any formal insurance.Mainly
because of this increase in social assistance, poverty has decreased substantial-
ly since 2002 (Yavuzkanat 2013). Figure 1 shows the change in annual poverty
rates since 2002. The proportion of people earning under US$4.3 per day has
decreased from about 30% in 2002 to 4% in 2011. Expenditure-based poverty
rates have also decreased from 27% in 2002 to about 18% in 2009, a milder
decrease due to the increase in inﬂation during the crisis. Unfortunately,
TurkStat stopped reporting expenditure-based poverty rates after 2009.HYPOTHESES AND MECHANISMS
Our discussion of the interplay among politics, policies, and religion within
the context of Turkey shows clearly that there is an internal consistency inFIG. 1.—Top, per capita GDP and total fertility; bottom, total social assistance expen-
diture (as percentage of GDP) and income-based poverty rate (data from the Turkish Sta-
tistical Institute).1305
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Allthe AK Parti’s strategic demography. Family and fertility are a target, both
ideologically and through welfare policies, and welfare targeted to the poor
is ameans to consolidate political power.Wewill focus on the ﬁrst decade of
AKParti rule, and in particular on the period that follows the local (mayoral)
elections held in 2004, less than two years after the national election marking
the ascent of Erdoğan to the prime ministry. We have seen that during this
period at least, welfare has been provided via a charity-based system orches-
trated by local governments, rather than through a national social policy im-
plemented in a standardized way across Turkey. Organic relationships be-
tween AK Parti local governments and the national-level government, and
the Islamic elements of this welfare system have givenAKParti local govern-
ments an advantage inmobilizing resources towardwelfare provision and in
implementing effective social policies. Therefore, our central empirical hypoth-
esis is that local AKParti governance has increased (or prevented the decline
of)marriage and fertility rates.Wewill directly test this causal hypothesis, us-
ing an appropriate design that exploits the unique natural experiment given
by 2004 local elections.
Our main hypothesis also resonates with previous empirical evidence on
local Islamic governance in Turkey. For instance, contrary to the common
belief that associates Islamic rule with undesirable outcomes for women, re-
search has shown that local Islamic rule may, in fact, improve women’s
well-being on a number of dimensions. Blaydes (2014), for example, shows
that women who live in areas ruled by an Islamic group in Cairo are better
off with respect to several reproductive health-related outcomes than a very
similar group of womenwho live in areas that are ruled by local strongmen.
More important, using a regression-discontinuity design that is closely related
to ours on the same societal setting,Meyersson (2014) shows that local Islamic
rule in 1994 in Turkey has a positive causal effect on female educational at-
tainment and on political participation in subsequent years. One way of in-
terpreting this outcome is as follows. Local Islamic rulers who operate in
countries with secular authoritarian central governments provide good local
services and empower the marginalized poor and pious because in doing so
they seek to “incrementally displace the state and traditional elites” (Blaydes
2014, p. 503). Nonstate service provision at the local level can be also seen as
an electoral strategy that helps in winning further votes (Thachil 2011). This
interpretation ﬁts the track record of the AK Parti, too. The massive welfare
spending that the AK Parti has mobilized starting from its early years, be
it clientelism or genuine concern for the poor, has helped the AK Parti in-
crease its support among the marginalized electorate and eventually secure
further its control of the central government (Metin 2011). As themainmech-
anism we posit runs through local welfare provision and the empowerment
of themarginalized poor, a related empirically testable hypothesis we state is
that local AK Parti governance has increased (or prevented the decline of)1306
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Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilitymarriage and fertility more in the poor parts of the country than in the less
poor parts.
The main mechanism we posit, therefore, works mostly through lifting
constraints on fertility andmarriage with effective welfare policies at the lo-
cal level. AK Parti’s local rule can also have an effect on marriage and fer-
tility throughmechanisms that are alternative or complementary to themain
one we posit. We introduce ﬁve of these mechanisms, for which we will be
able to carry out empirical tests. First, there is an economic development
mechanism: districts in which the AK Parti won local elections could have
beneﬁted from improved economic conditionsmore so than districts inwhich
the opposition won. Although one would expect that better economic condi-
tions would favor a decrease in fertility, as in classic demographic transition
theory (Cleland and Wilson 1987; Kirk 1996), they might encourage young
people to marry and perhaps even to have more children, as it is assumed
in advanced societies (Gauthier 2007; Goldstein et al. 2013). Second, there
is a religiosity mechanism: local AK Parti governance could have affected
the religious preferences of individuals, rather than the constraints they face.
This reversal in secularization would also be consistent with changing pref-
erences toward earlier marriage and higher fertility. Third, there is a prefer-
ence mechanism: local AK Parti governance may have effected fertility and
marriage not through affecting constraints but through changing prefer-
ences as a consequence of AK Parti’s positions.
Two other mechanisms are complementary to our main one. Our fourth
is an infant health mechanism: even if local AK Parti governance may not
have altered the preferences or opportunities to havemore children, it could
still affect children’s survival chances by simply reducing infant mortality.
The latter mechanism is consistent with our welfare provision narrative, al-
though it does not posit any effects on marriage. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal mecha-
nism is welfare migration: districts governed by the AK Parti may have se-
lectively attracted larger families and families with children or those who
intended to marry or have larger families.DATA AND METHODS
In order to test ourmain hypothesis and to assess the potentialmechanisms,we
compiled three different data setsmatching information fromdifferent sources,
at different geographical levels. For the ﬁrst two data sets, we matched ofﬁ-
cial election results with administrative demographic statistics, data on eco-
nomic well-being, and information on religious school attendance. These two
data sets differ with respect to both the operationalization of our key vari-
ables and the level at which variables are measured. For the third data set,
wematched ofﬁcial election results withmicrolevel data from theTurkeyDe-
mographic and Health Survey (TDHS). The compilation and use of three1307
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Allcomplementary data sets allows us to triangulate our ﬁndings and to conduct
robustness checks. Moreover, taken together these data sets will allow us to
assess the mechanisms discussed earlier. We explain below key features of
these three data sets.District-Level Data Set
To build the ﬁrst data set, the district-level data set, we matched our main
variables of interest (i.e., election results in 2004) with ofﬁcial demographic
statistics published by TurkStat at the district (İlçe) level, as well as addi-
tional demographic, political, and socioeconomic variables. Districts are
clustered in larger provinces (İl ). While the number of provinces has been
stable at 81 since 1999, the number of districts has been increasing mildly
over time, with 919 in 1999 to a maximum of 970 in 2013, mainly through new
districts splitting from old ones because of increased population. Figure 2
shows a map with districts in 2007. The district is the lowest geographical
and electoral unit for which TurkStat provides data on marital status and
fertility. For this reason, we chose the district-level data set as the central one
in our analyses.
The main variables in the data set (i.e., fertility, marriage, and election re-
sults) are computed as follows. For what concerns fertility, we use Turk-
Stat’s data from the Address Based PopulationRegistration System (ABPS).
The ABPS reports the number of people registered in a district broken down
by age increments of ﬁve years. Using these ABPS data, we estimate the gen-
eral fertility rate averaged over the last ﬁve consecutive years (a-GFR) for
the ﬁve-year period i in district j 5 ð1, ::: , 916Þ as
a-GFR ij 5
♯children age 0–4ð Þij




We take i5 2006–10 as ourmain outcome variable. To be precise, a-GFR is
a measure of reproduction (fertility and survival), rather than just fertility.
In the results section below, we provide additional analysis with infantmor-
tality statistics to separate fertility from the survival chances of children. By
using the 2006–10 interval, we ensure that all children born within this time
frame are conceived after the 2004 elections. We also calculate a-GFR for
2010–14 (i.e., the most recent period for which fertility data are available).
Although a-GFR is not an ideal measure for fertility, we use it because other
fertility indicators are not available at the district level (Işik and Pinarcioğlu
2006). In fact, a-GFR is equivalent to the “child-woman ratio” used by Işik
and Pinarcioğlu. The only difference is that we divide the child-woman
ratio by ﬁve, which enables us to interpret a-GFR as an average over ﬁve1308
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Allconsecutive years between 2006 and 2010 and between 2010 and 2014. Fig-
ure 2C shows the geographical distribution of a-GFR in 2006–10 across the
districts. In line with Işik and Pinarcioğlu (2006), we ﬁnd a clear geographical
variation. Eastern and southeastern districts have very high a-GFR, with a
gradual decrease toward the west. The fertility differences shown in ﬁgure
2C correspond roughly to an ethnic Turkish versus Kurdish difference in fer-
tility patterns (Koc, Hancioglu, and Cavlin 2008). For a placebo test and as a
statistical control, we also calculate a-GFR for 1996–2000 using the 2000 cen-
sus data.
For what concernsmarriage, we use the district-level administrative data
that, starting in 2008, TurkStat publishes specifying the number of married
and total men and women from 15 years old onward in age increments of
ﬁve years.We calculate the percentage of married men andwomen for each
ﬁve-year age group in 2008 and 2009. The latest marriage data available
from TurkStat before 2008 are in the 2000 census. Unfortunately, unlike
the data for 2008 onward, the 2000 census does not break down marriage
prevalence in ﬁve-year increments and includes only the number of married
and total men and women who are age 12 and older. Figure 2D shows the
distribution of the percentage of married adult men across districts. Note
that the percentage of married men and women indicates marriage preva-
lence rather than incidence. This is perhaps not ideal because some of those
who are married in a district by 2008 and 2009 could, in fact, have gotten
married before the 2004 elections.We adjust for this problem by taking into
account the pre-2004 marriage prevalence by dividing gender- and age-
speciﬁc marriage prevalence in 2008 and 2009 by gender-speciﬁc marriage
prevalence in 2000.More formally,we compute themarriage prevalence ratio
for each gender g 5 ð1, 2Þ, age interval k 5 ð15–19, :::: , 40–44Þ, year i 5








Forwhat concerns election results, wemeasure theAKParti winning/los-
ing margin for each district. Twenty parties and a number of independent
candidates participated in the 2004 elections for 916 districts. The AK Parti
won 56% of the districts.We calculate the 2004 AKParti winning (or losing)
margin as the difference between the vote share of the AK Parti and of the
largest of the remaining parties in a district. Figure 2B shows the geograph-
ical distribution of the district-level AK Parti winning/losing margin. If the
winning/losing margin is above zero, the district receives the treatment (i.e.,
a local AK Parti governance).
As the district-level data set has the highest geographical precision at the
relevant electoral unit, we can perform extensive robustness checks and1310
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and marriage prevalence in 2000, we use the natural logarithm of the num-
ber of registered electorate by 2004 as a proxy for district size and the AK
Parti vote share in 2004 for speciﬁcation tests. Additionally, we also com-
pute an indicator of support for political Islam in the pre–AK Parti era, us-
ing the vote share of the Virtue Party at 1999 district elections. The Virtue
Party was the largest Islamist party in Turkey until 2001.15 We also add to
this data set the geographical region and the relative poverty level of the dis-
trict’s province estimated by Doğan (2014).Province-Level Data Set
To build our second data set, the province-level data set, we matched elec-
tion results with administrative data on marriage and fertility (and on some
potentially important mediators) at the province level. The district-level data
set provides the best geographical precision for the relevant electoral unit
and, therefore, provides the best measurement of the key political determi-
nants. However, as we already discussed, fertility and marriage statistics
published by TurkStat at the district level are not optimal. At the more ag-
gregate province level, we can make use of better marriage and fertility data
(i.e., more precise demographic rates).
For what concerns fertility, from 2009 onward, for each province Turk-
Stat publishes the number of births (rather than the number of children
between 0 and 4 years) in a given year. We can thus compute the annual
provincial-level general fertility rate (GFR) directly as the ratio between
the number of births in a year per 100 women age 16–44. Formally, GFR
for province p 5 1, ... , 81 and year j 5 2009, ... , 2014 is computed as
GFR pj 5
♯birthsð Þpj
♯women age 16–49ð Þpj 100: (3)
Unlike a-GFR in equation (1), GFR in equation (3) is not affected by infant
mortality.
For what concerns marriage, for each province TurkStat publishes gender-
speciﬁc annual marriage rates (the number of men and women married in a
given year). As our gender-speciﬁc provincial measure, we calculate annual
marriage rates per 1,000 men and women in a province. For simplicity, we
restrict themarriage rates to the combined age range of 16–44 years. Ourmar-
riage rate variable covers eight years from2006 to 2013. Formally, our provin-
cial marriage ratemeasure for gender g 5 ð1, 2Þ for the combined 16–44 age
cohort in year i 5 ð2006, ::: , 2013Þ and province p 5 ð1, ::: , 81Þ is15 We thank an AJS reviewer for pointing us to this potentially important variable.
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For what concerns election results, we have to provide an indirect mea-
sure. Each province has a province center, which is also a district. In 2004,
for 16 provinces the district center spanned more than one district (metropol-
itan municipalities). We calculate a province-level AK Parti win/lose margin
as the win/lose margin of the AK Parti in the province center or in the met-
ropolitan municipality. Using the win/lose margin at the provincial center
is a coarsemeasure of Islamic governance in a province. This is becausewhile
they report to the province center, noncentral districts are separate adminis-
trative units. Therefore, measurement error in our province-level analyses
will be higher, and this is also the reasonwhy our central results are discussed
with reference to the district-level data set. Nevertheless, province centers are
the largest and most powerful districts within a province. Hence, the out-
comes in the province center likely dominate the provincial demographic
and economic indicators. Moreover, any positive result despite the measure-
ment error in our province-level data should be reassuring.
We can use a number of additional province-level variables to test the
mechanisms discussed earlier or as controls. We therefore use (1) (natural
logarithm of) annual net immigration to a province for the 0–4 age cohort
between 2006 and 2014, (2) (natural logarithm of) annual net immigration
to a province for women age 15–49 between 2006 and 2014, (3) annual pro-
vincial unemployment rate (in percentage points) between 2008 and 2013,
(4) infant mortality per 1,000 births between 2009 and 2014, and (5) gender-
speciﬁc Quran course participation rate (per 1,000) among the relevant age
cohort (between 15 and 49) as an indicator of provincial religiosity. Immigra-
tion, unemployment, and infant mortality statistics are published by Turk-
Stat only at the provincial level. The Quran course participation rates are
published by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (TPRA; in Turk-
ish, Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) at the province level, too. TPRA is a govern-
mental institution established in 1924 whosemain aims include “carrying out
religious affairs pertaining to faith, worship and moral principles, informing
the society on religion and administering places of worship.”16 The Quran
courses organized by TPRA are completely voluntary, take eight months
to complete, and treat various topics about theQuran and religion.Obviously
the number of people who completed these courses does not cover all aspects
of religiosity. Yet, it shows the local demand on training and knowledge
about theQuran and Islam and should serve as a good indicator of religiosity.16 For further information, see http://diyanet.gov.tr/en-US/Institutional/Detail//1/estab
lishment-and-a-brief-history (May 28, 2013; accessed December 21, 2017; in English).
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To build our third data set, the individual-level data set, we matched the
province-level election measure we just illustrated with the Turkey Demo-
graphic and Health Survey conducted in 2013 (TDHS-2013). TDHS-2013
provides a representative sample of Turkish households with a weighted,
multistage, stratiﬁed cluster sampling approach. All women between age
15 and 49 living in the sampled households were interviewed. This resulted
in a sample of 9,746 interviewed women (individual response rate was 90%
and household response rate was 93%). (For further details of the data set
and of the data collection procedure, see Hacettepe University Institute of
Population Studies [2014]). This individual-level data set allows us to ana-
lyze the effect of local Islamic governance on individual-level marriage and
fertility behavior. Moreover, using TDHS-2013 allows us to include a num-
ber of potentially important individual-level mediators, such as religiosity,
fertility preferences, social security status, and controls such as ethnicity, which
are not available in our district- and province-level administrative data sets.
For fertility, using the TDHS-2013 survey, we simply calculate the num-
ber of births a woman has given after 2004, that is, after the treatment. For
marriage, as TDHS-2013 records the marital status of the respondent, we
include only those who were younger than 28 by 2013, which ensures that,
because of the legal minimum age of marriage in Turkey (which is 16), in
this restricted sample all married women were married after 2004. We then
measure whether respondents married after 2004.
For election results, the TDHS-2013 includes the province of the respon-
dent, and all 81 provinces are sampled in the survey. Yet, not all districts are
included in the survey. Also, the information about the district of the re-
spondent is suppressed from the publicly available data set. Consequently,
we had tomatch TDHS-2013with the election outcomes in 2004 at the prov-
ince level rather than at the district level. We therefore adopted the same
strategy as the one illustrated for the province-level data set.
The TDHS-2013 survey provides us with important individual-level in-
formation on demographic behavior and other variables that help us in dis-
entangling different mechanisms. Most important, the survey asks about
both fertility preferences and differences in constraints women face because
of local welfare provision. The survey measures participants’ fertility pref-
erences by asking respondents without children “if you could choose exactly
the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that
be?” and respondents with children “if you could go back to the time when
you did not have any children and could choose exactly the number of chil-
dren to have in your whole life, howmany would that be?”Even if this var-
iable is not a perfect measure of preferences (Johnson-Hanks 2007), it has
been used as a standard DHS question to measure the “demand for chil-1313
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Alldren” to discuss the impact of population policies (Pritchett 1994). TDHS-
2013 also measures whether the respondent fasts, veils, and performs the
regular namaz. We construct an individual religiosity score as the average
of these three items (Cronbach’s a is 0.7).
For what concerns welfare, the survey does not include information on
whether a respondent or her household received any social assistance from
the local government. However, it records whether the respondent has
health insurance and if so what kind. About 11% of all respondents do
not have any form of health insurance. Among thosewho have health insur-
ance, we are particularly interested in whether a respondent has General
Health Insurance. Typically, for formally employed women health insur-
ance is provided through the Social Security Institution or private compa-
nies. Local authorities do not have a direct inﬂuence on those insurances
provided by the Social Security Institution or private companies. Addition-
ally, Turkey has a General Health Insurance (GSS) program that aims to
cover all individuals who do not have any other social security. GSS, which
was formerly called the green card, provides free insurance for those who
qualify after an “income test” done by the local municipality. If local Islamic
governance affects welfare provision, we should be able to detect this, at
least partially, by looking atGSS coverage.Wemust add that GSS coverage
does not entirely capture the extent and effectiveness of all elements of local
welfare provision, such as conditional cash transfers, housing aids, prenatal
training, and so on. It is, nonetheless, an important element of social wel-
fare. In addition, using TDHS-2013we further control for age (in years), ed-
ucation (in years), wealth, occupational status, and ethnicity (mother tongue
Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, or other) of the respondent.
Simple descriptive analyses of our data show that there is no signiﬁcant
correlation between the level of support for the AK Parti and fertility, at
both the ecological and the individual level. The correlation between the
AK Parti rule and the GFR at the province level varies, depending on the
year, between 20.03 and 0.02. At the district level the same correlation is
0.03 in 2010 and20.01 in 2014. In the individual-level data set the correla-
tion between the AK Parti rule and the number of children a woman had
after 2005 is 0.03. None of those correlations are statistically signiﬁcant.
We will show below that this lack of correlation is, in fact, hiding a real re-
lationship. We now turn to discuss our main analytical strategy, the use of
RDD, which has a number of desirable properties in establishing causality.RDD and the Estimation of Causal Effects
In order to estimate the effect of AK Parti local rule on marriage and fertil-
ity, conventional, regression-basedmethods that directly compare the treat-1314
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(districts with other parties winning) are not adequate. This lack of ade-
quacy arises because votes for the AK Parti are likely to be correlated with
factors (confounders) that, in turn, also inﬂuence marriage and fertility, and
it is not possible to control for all these confounders. As Gelman and Hill
(2006) show, even when accessing all possible confounders, and including
them in a regression model, the functional form of the model is crucial in
the identiﬁcation of the causal effect. These difﬁculties of estimating causal
effects are present in almost all conventional regression-based analyses of
observational data.
Our identiﬁcation of causal effects uses the difference between the vote
share of the AK Parti and of the largest of the remaining parties as the “run-
ning variable” in an RDD. RDDhas very good properties to estimate causal
effects (see, e.g., Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960; Hahn, Todd, and Van
der Klaauw 2001; Morgan and Winship 2007; Imbens and Lemieux 2008;
Lee and Lemieux 2010). It is thus worthwhile to explain the RDD frame-
work in detail. In an RDD a treatment variable t is assigned to observations
on the basis of a so-called running variable x and a threshold value c. In a
typical setting with sharp discontinuity, t 5 1 if x > c, and t 5 0 otherwise.
In our case, if the difference between the vote shares of the AKParti and the
largest of the remaining parties (the running variable) is larger than zero,
then an AK Parti mayor is assigned (treatment); otherwise, a mayor of an-
other party is assigned (control). The generic outcome variable y is predicted
using the treatment indicator t and a function of the running variable x for
the observation i; that is,
E yið Þ 5 a 1 f xið Þ 1 b  ti with ti 5  
1 if xi ≥ c
0 if xi < c
  8 xi ∈ c 2 h, c 1 hð Þ:
(
(5)
In equation (5), the b coefﬁcient estimates the treatment effect, and f (x) is
a control function of x ﬁtted using observations within an h bandwidth
around c. It is generally advised to ﬁt f (x) separately on both sides of c
(i.e., allow the shape of f (x) to vary below and above c within h), for the re-
lationship between y and f (x) may differ below and above the threshold,
and imposing the same function on both sides may introduce bias (de la
Cuesta and Imai 2016). The b coefﬁcient can be interpreted as a causal ef-
fect if the values of the treatment variable t are (as-if ) randomly assigned to
observations around the threshold value c by nature. In other words, the
cases just around the threshold are expected to be balanced on all observed
and unobserved confounders, just as in a randomized experiment, therefore
creating a natural experiment. This design allows us to interpret b as the es-
(1315
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Alltimate of a causal effect.17 RDDs are widely used in political science, and in
close popular elections based on a majoritarian system, the (as-if ) random-
ness assumption is shown to hold in almost all cases (Eggers et al. 2015).
This is because in popular elections random noise in the electoral system,
such as a few pro– or anti–AK Parti voters failing to turn up because of ill-
ness or accident, is sufﬁcient to tilt the results of very close elections in one
way or the other.
One can test whether the assumption of randomness around the thresh-
old. One way of testing is to compare cases just around the threshold with
respect to the values of pretreatment covariates using the same RDDmodel
in equation (1) but replacing y with pretreatment covariates. If the assign-
ment is indeed (as-if) random, one should not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant differences
between the treatment and control in pretreatment covariates. A second test
is the so-called McCrary’s (2008) density test. This test does not require any
pretreatment covariates because it compares simply the density of the run-
ning variable x around the threshold. If the as-if randomness assumption
holds, one should not see any discontinuity in the density. If, however, there
is sorting (which means that certain types of cases are more successful in
crossing over the threshold), this will create imbalances in the density of x
around the threshold. Such imbalances are detected by McCrary’s test. We
present below the results of these tests in our case. Such tests should be per-
formed routinely for any application of an RDD.
As recommended in de la Cuesta and Imai’s (2016) review of the RDDs in
close elections, we use a local linear speciﬁcation for f (x), ﬁtted separately
below and above c (Nichols 2007, 2014), and the standard Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012)method to estimate an optimal bandwidth h^ for a given
outcome variable.18 There are two other, rather small, Islamic parties, namely,
Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) and BBP (Great Union Party), that also partic-
ipated in the elections. As in Meyersson (2014), one could calculate Islamic
win/losemargin as the difference between the vote share of the largest Islamic
party (i.e., the largest of the AK Parti, the Saadet, and the BBP) and of the
largest secular party (i.e., the largest among the rest). In our case, this alterna-Technically, b can be interpreted as an estimate of a causal effect if the potential out-
omes are continuous at c (de laCuesta and Imai 2016). This is a less stringent assumption
an as-if randomness around c. This nuance is not important in application as long as
x) is appropriately included in the analysis.
Our appendix, available online, includes extensive robustness checks with alternative
andwidths and speciﬁcations of f(x). It also includes robustness checks of our measures
f fertility, marriage, and province-level RD results, as well as of the effects of AK Parti
overnance onmarriage prevalence rather thanmarriage prevalence ratios at the district
vel. Finally the appendix includes descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our
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the BBP won any of the 81 province centers, and the BBP won only three
of the 916 districts. Consequently, the results we present are virtually identi-
cal to the results obtained with this alternative operationalization. As the AK
Parti win/lose margin can also be interpreted as the Islamic win/lose margin,
in what follows we use local AK Parti governance and Islamic governance
interchangeably.
An important point about RDDs is that while they enable estimation of
causal effects, this estimated effect is local. This is because the analysis is re-
stricted to the caseswithin an h bandwidth around the threshold.19 Thismay
hinder external validity, that is, drawing inferences about the causal effect
for cases away from the threshold. In our case, for example, what we can es-
timate with an RDD is the causal effect of Islamic governance in highly con-
tested areas. Depending on the particular application and whether the cases
around the threshold are expected to be different from the cases far away
from the threshold, this external validity issuemay ormay not be a problem.
Wewill discuss this point after presenting our results and argue that external
validity issues are less problematic in our case.
RDDs based on close electoral races have been applied in political science
to study electoral effects (Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Eggers et al. 2015).
Similarly, RDDs have been used to great acclaim in economics and educa-
tional research (Morgan andWinship 2007; Gangl 2010) but have remained
mostly unexploited so far in sociology (Bernardi 2014).Tests of the RDD Identiﬁcation Assumption
Before presenting ourmain results,we discuss a number of validity tests (Im-
bens andLemieux 2008;McCrary 2008;Lee andLemieux 2010) for theRDD.
The results of these tests are depicted inﬁgure 3. First,weperformaMcCrary
(2008) test of discontinuity of the density at the threshold (upper-left panel).
The test returns a discontinuity estimate of 0.14 with a standard error of
0.17, showing no signiﬁcant jump at the threshold.20 Moreover, the ﬁgure
shows that the majority of the districts are located close to the threshold, so
that analyses based on the discontinuity at the threshold are relevant for an
important number of districts inTurkey. In fact, the number of districts around
the threshold that are used to calculate our subsequent RD estimates turns
out to bemore than half of all districts. This indicates thatwhile by deﬁnition19 While there are methods proposed to extrapolate RDD results to the cases away from
the threshold, the usefulness of those methods has been questioned, as they imperil the
design’s main advantage in internal validity (de la Cuesta and Imai 2016).
20 On a minority of occasions, outcomes of close elections are shown to be nonrandom
(Caughey and Sekhon 2011; but also see Eggers et al. 2015). We do not ﬁnd evidence
against randomness of close elections in 2004 for district-level outcomes.
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AllanRDestimate is local, in our case the estimated local effect is also externally
valid as it is based on the majority of cases.
Second, we inspect whether a number of pretreatment variables display
discontinuities at the threshold, as “placebo tests.” Such discontinuities of
control variables, if they existed, would undermine the identiﬁcation as-FIG. 3.—Validity checks and placebo tests1318
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ber of registered electorate in 2004 is considered.Most important, there is no
signiﬁcant RD effect of the 2004 elections on a-GFR in 1996–2000 and on
marriage prevalence in 2000, four years before the elections. Finally, there
is no signiﬁcant RD effect of the 2004 elections on the support for political
Islam in the pre–AKParti era, measured by the vote share of the Virtue Party
in 1999. Consequently, we conclude that an RDD is valid in our case, andwe
have a natural experiment in which incumbency is assigned as-if randomly
across districts at the winning threshold.MAIN RESULTS
Fertility
Applying RDD to our district-level data set, we ﬁnd that local Islamic gov-
ernance in 2004 has yielded on average about 7.75more annual children per
1,000 women between 2006 and 2010 (Imbens and Kalyanaraman [KI] op-
timal bandwidth 5 :15; N 5 541). This effect is statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 4 presents the RDD estimation, including point estimates and stan-
dard errors, which are robust to nonnormality and clustering of districts
within provinces.21
When we control in the same RDDmodel for fertility in 1996–2000, num-
ber of registered electorate in 2004 (logged), geographical region (dummies for
east and southeast Anatolia), percentages ofmarriedmen andwomen in 2000,
the relative poverty of the district’s province, and support for political Islam
in 1999, the effect is reduced to 5.24 but remains statistically signiﬁcant (clus-
ter robust SE 5 2:476, two-sided P < :05). While the effect size decreases
after adding these controls, the difference with and without controls is, in
fact, statistically insigniﬁcant (x2ð1Þ 5 1:06, two-sidedP 5 :32)—this result
is obtained using the seemingly unrelated estimation approach of Weesie
(1999).21 The number of districts is slightly larger in 2006–10 and 2010–14 than in 2004. When
we estimate the RD effects, we exclude the new districts that split from the districts that
already existed in 2004. To check whether this exclusion may have affected our results,
we reestimated the RD effect but this time including only the districts belonging to prov-
inces in which there was no change in the number of districts after 2004. In this alterna-
tive estimation, there cannot be any selection effect, as the number of districts has been
stable throughout. TheRD effect obtained for this subset is in fact larger and signiﬁcantly
different from zero but not signiﬁcantly different from that reported in ﬁg. 4 (difference5
4.13, SE of difference 5 5.55, P-value for test of difference 5 0.46). Moreover, in our
province- and individual-level analyses below, we use all cases (as the independent var-
iable is at the province level and the number of provinces has been constant) and obtain
qualitatively the same results. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust with respect
to the missing observations at the district level.
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AllThe lower-left panel inﬁgure 4 shows that there has been a positive, yet not
statistically signiﬁcant, effect also for 2010–14 (KI optimal bandwidth 5 :125;
N 5 467). While this estimate shows that the effect of local Islamic gover-
nance in 2004 does not seem to inﬂuence demographic behavior in 2010–14
to the same extent as it does in 2006–10, it also implies that the increase in fer-
tility in 2006–10 is not counterbalanced by a successive decrease. A smaller
effect is to be expected as the leading party has shifted in some districts. This
lack of a negative effect on the 2010–14 outcomes also denotes the absence of
what in demography is known as a pure tempo effect (i.e., an effect due to the
average age at birth and not to total fertility; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998).FIG. 4.—Local Islamic governance and fertility. Left top and bottom, district-level out-
comes by district-level election results; right top, individual-level outcomes by province-
level election results; right bottom, province-level outcomes by province-level election re-
sults. Includes local polynomial smoothers (thick lines) with gray lines as 90% conﬁdence
intervals. Local linear RD point estimates for KI optimal bandwidths, their cluster-adjusted
robust SEs, and two-sided P-values are included below each panel.1320
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Political Islam, Marriage, and FertilityApplying the RDD approach to our province-level data set, we ﬁnd that
local Islamic governance in 2004 in the province center has yielded, on av-
erage, about 1.96 more births in a province per 100 women between age 16
and 49 (KI optimal bandwidth 5 0:16; N 5 240; see ﬁg. 4 bottom-right
panel for the cluster robust standard error and the P-value). Because the
provincial-level measure of fertility is annual (rather than a ﬁve-year aver-
age as at the district level), we can test whether this causal effect diminishes
over time. We provide the result of this test in the next section in which we
further discuss the mechanisms.
Applying RDD to our individual-level data set, we ﬁnd that local Islamic
governance in the province center increases the number of births after 2005
by 0.14 (KI optimal bandwidth 5 0:18; N 5 5,377; see top-right panel in
ﬁg. 4). This estimate remains effectively unchanged when we control for a
number of important individual covariates, that is, age, number of births be-
fore 2005, education,wealth, individual religiosity, ideal number of children,
whether the respondent has General Health Insurance, occupational status,
and ethnicity, and province random effects (RD coefﬁcient after controls 5
0:14, SE 5 :07, P 5 :047).
Two features of those ﬁndings are important for the external validity of
our results. First, recall that because of the distribution of the running var-
iable, themajority of districts arewithin the c bandwidth around the thresh-
old. This is because, inmost districts, the race between the AK Parti and the
largest remaining party has been highly contested. Hence, while an RDD
estimate is, by its nature, valid for highly contested districts, because in
2004most districts are highly contested, our results apply directly to thema-
jority of cases. Second, note in ﬁgure 1 the association between fertility and
the AK Parti win/lose margin below and above the winning threshold of
zero. Fertility decreases steadily as the AK Parti win/lose margin increases,
but only until the threshold. At the threshold fertility jumps, which is the
base of our RDD estimates. Above the threshold, however, fertility remains
relatively stable or increases slightly as the AK Parti win/lose margin further
increases. These trends are similar for the district-, province-, and individual-
level analyses. If we were to extrapolate the causal RDD estimate obtained
at the threshold to the cases away from the threshold, particularly to the dis-
tricts in which the AK Parti has a large margin of victory, we would need to
extrapolate the trend to the left of the threshold to the right. This extrapola-
tion would show what would have happened in those districts with a large
AK Parti win margin had those districts been ruled by a non-Islamist party
(i.e., the potential outcomes above the threshold), assuming that the trend to
the left of the threshold would also apply throughout. Then, we could com-
pare the extrapolated line with the actual trend estimated above the thresh-
old. This exercise would clearly show that the effect estimated at the thresh-
old would not be smaller in districts with a large AK Parti win margin; in1321
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FIG. 5.—Local Islamic governance and age-speciﬁc marriage prevalence ratios among
en (A) and women (B) at the district level. Includes local polynomial smoothers (thick
nes) with gray lines as 90% conﬁdence intervals.
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Allfact, the effect size would be higher.22 If the AK Parti had concentrated only
in highly contested areas (i.e., potential “swing districts”) and not invested in
districts in which they won comfortably, we would see a decreasing trend to
the right of the threshold, too, which is obviously not the case. Hence, our
results not only apply to highly contested districts, but they seem to apply
also to cases away from the threshold.Marriage
For the district-level data set, ﬁgure 5 presents the RDD results formarriage
prevalence ratios. Table 1 includes local linear RD point estimates for opti-
mal bandwidths and their robust standard errors. These estimates show
that local Islamic governance has had a signiﬁcant positive effect onmarriage
prevalence among adult men in 2008 and 2009 relative to marriage preva-
lence in 2000. The effect for men is quite consistent for 2008 and 2009 aswell
as for separate age groups, although it is strongest within the 25–44 years
range (see ﬁg. 5A).
AK Parti rule also has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on female marriage
prevalence ratios, especially among the younger age groups (15–34 years).
For older age groups, standard errors are relatively high. It seems that fe-
male marriage ratios, particularly among older cohorts, are generally less
responsive to local political rule than male marriage ratios (see ﬁg. 5B).
Using the province-level data set, the RDD estimate of the effect of local
Islamic governance in 2004 on female marriage rates is obtained as 4.41 (KI
optimal bandwidth 5 0:22; N 5 440) and on male marriage rates as 3.82
(KI optimal bandwidth 5 0:32; N 5 544). Both effects are statistically and
substantially signiﬁcant (seeﬁg. 6 for those effectswith cluster robust standard
errors and P-values). Below we test whether these effects vary over time.
Using the individual-level data set, we obtain an RDD estimate of the ef-
fect of local Islamic governance in the province center on the probability of
being married, provided that a respondent is younger than 28 by 2013 (i.e.,
themarriage has happened after the 2004 elections). Figure 6 (bottom panel)
shows that Islamic governance increases the probability of being married by
about 10 percentage points (KI optimal bandwidth 5 0:27;N 5 2,806). This
effect is both statistically and substantially signiﬁcant. This estimate remains
effectively unchanged when we control for age, education, wealth, ideal
number of children, occupational status, ethnicity, and province random ef-
fects (RD coefﬁcient after controls 5 0:10, SE 5 :053, P 5 :059).22 This extrapolation exercise should be treated with caution, as it relies on untestable as-
sumptions due to the “fundamental problem of causal inference,” such as that the trend to
the left of the threshold would apply to the right of the threshold, too (see de la Cuesta and
Imai 2016).
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Political Islam, Marriage, and FertilityHeterogeneous Effects and Health Insurance
We hypothesized that the mechanisms that yield the previous substantial
causal effects are related to the wave of socioeconomic assistance the AK
Parti has launched through local authorities who targeted young families,
mothers, and in general the poor. We use two strategies to assess this hy-
pothesis. First, we test whether the causal effect of local Islamic governance
is heterogeneous and stronger in poorer areas. This is because, ﬁrst, social
assistance is expected to be more prevalent in poorer districts, and, second,
it will have a larger marginal effect (thus will be more efﬁcient) for the poor.
Second, we test whether the AK Parti rule has a signiﬁcant causal effect on
General Health Insurance coverage (as opposed to no coverage).
Using the province-level data set, we estimate conditional (heteroge-
neous) causal effects through an interaction of the binary treatment indicator
(AK Parti governance) with the poverty ranking of the district’s province us-
ing the sameRDD reported above. The poverty rankings of provinces are cal-
culated by Doğan (2014) using a number of poverty indicators published by
TurkStat. As we have an appropriate causal design, we can estimateTABLE 1
Local Linear Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect
of AK Parti Rule in 2004 on Marriage Rates
15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 25–44 15–44
Men:
2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .281 2.21 10.88** 10.62** 7.95* 5.691 8.70** 3.691
(.16) (1.66) (3.93) (3.62) (3.39) (3.23) (3.14) (2.16)
[.22] [.13] [.09] [.09] [.10] [.11] [.09] [.07]
2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 2.17 12.01** 9.30** 8.35* 6.351 8.95** 3.431
(.15) 1.69 (4.04) (3.54) (3.36) (3.39) (3.27) (1.99)
[.19] [.14] [.09] [.10] [.10] [.11] [.08] [.09]
15–34 15–44
Women:
2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.87* 6.13* 5.17* 3.21 3.441 2.72 3.81* 2.761
(1.42) (3.01) (2.31) (2.21) (2.04) (1.96) (1.59) (1.59)
[.11] [.17] [.14] [.15] [.15] [.17] [.13] [.13]
2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.421 2.79 5.87* 3.50 3.17 3.311 3.56* 2.03
(1.35) (2.15) (2.30) (2.28) (2.25) (2.00) (1.79) (1.76)
[.12] [.38] [.14] [.15] [.11] [.17] [.11] [.12]This content
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Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilityheterogeneous causal effects free from sample selection bias (Breen, Choi, and
Holm 2015). We ﬁnd that indeed the causal effects of Islamic governance on
fertility are heterogeneous.The top twopanels ofﬁgure 7 show these effects by
poverty ranking: effects on fertility in 2006–10 and in 2010–14 are the stron-
gest and statistically signiﬁcant in poorer areas, but they are not statistically
signiﬁcantly different from zero in the richest areas. However, we do not ﬁnd
any evidence that the causal effects of Islamic governance onmale and female
marriage prevalence ratios are heterogeneous (results available on request).
Using our individual-level data set and our RDD strategy, we ﬁnd a very
strong and statistically signiﬁcantwelfare effect (see the bottompanel ofﬁg. 7):
Islamic governance increases the probability of having General Health In-
surance coverage, as opposed to having no coverage, by about 0.27% (KI op-
timal bandwidth 5 0:19; N 5 1,240). This effect of Islamic governance on
insurance coverage is very similar among both employed (RD estimate 5
0:21, cluster robust SE 5 0:09, P 5 :022; KI optimal bandwidth 5 0:19:
N 5 605) and unemployed (RD estimate 5 0:31, cluster robust SE 5
0:13, P 5 :019; KI optimal bandwidth 5 0:37; N 5 999) women. In turn,
havingGeneral Health Insurance has a positive effect on the number of chil-
dren born after 2005, even after controlling for the AKParti rule, the running
variable (winning/losing margin), age, number of births before 2005, educa-
tion, wealth, religiosity, ideal number of children, occupational status, and
ethnicity (coefficient 5 :075, SE 5 :039, P 5 :053).TESTING ALTERNATIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY MECHANISMS
We have documented a causal effect of local Islamic governance on subse-
quent marriage and fertility behavior using data from different levels and
sources. We have interpreted this ﬁnding in light of our hypothesis that this
result depends on the local charity-based social assistance system promoted
by the AKParti and provided evidence in support of this mechanism. In our
hypotheses andmechanisms section, we anticipated a number of alternative
or complementary mechanisms that would explain the causal effect of AK
Parti governance on fertility andmarriage through pathways different from
local welfare provision. In this sectionwe provide additional evidence using
the province-level and individual-level data set.
A ﬁrst alternative is the economic developmentmechanism: districts ruled
by the AKParti mayors might have thrived from an economic point of view,
and this would imply higher fertility and marriage rates. This economic
effect would be a plausible consequence of the support of the central AKParti
government.Here, our key test uses province-level data fromTurkStat on the
most relevant indicator of the economic cycle, namely, annual unemployment
rates between 2008 and 2013.1327
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.032 on May 23, 2018 10:19:10 AM





aFIG. 7.—Top and middle, heterogeneous causal effects of district-level Islamic gover-
ance by the poverty ranking of district’s province; 90%conﬁdence intervals are included.
ottom, causal effect of Islamic governance in the province center on the probability of
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Political Islam, Marriage, and FertilityA second alternative is the religiosity mechanism: residents of the districts
ruled by the AK Parti could have become more religious because of the Is-
lamic stance of the ruling party. This increase in religiosity per se could have
changed preferences and resulted in more marriages and higher fertility,
even if there is no prior evidence that clearly shows that a higher religiosity
per se results in a higher propensity tomarry and higher fertility (McQuillan
2004). In this subsection, we address potential effects of the AKParti rule on
religiosity, ﬁrst, using the TPRA data on Quran course completion rates
and, second, using the TDHS-2013 data on individual-level religiosity.
Third, there is the preference mechanism: local AK Parti governancemay
have effected fertility not through affecting constraints but through chang-
ing fertility preferences of families because of, for example, AK Parti’s pure
pro-natalist or conservative rhetoric. This mechanism is similar to the reli-
giosity mechanism discussed above. Using our individual-level data set, we
can test directlywhether local AKParti governance effects the ideal number
of children, which is a ﬁne measure of fertility preferences.
Fourth, there is the infant health mechanism. In this case, the increase in
the share of surviving children up to age 5 (an indicator of net reproduction)
would be explained by a decrease in infant mortality, rather than by an in-
crease in fertility rates (an indicator of gross reproduction). This is a comple-
mentary type of pathway as it still relies on local welfare provision.Wemust
add, however, that the effect of the AKParti rule onmarriage rates suggests
that the effect of the AK Parti on fertility cannot be only due to differential
infant mortality. To address infant health, we analyzed the annual number
of infant deaths before reaching age 1 per 1,000 births, from 2009 to 2014, at
the provincial level.
Finally, there is the welfare migration mechanism: districts ruled by the
AK Parti may have attracted more married couples and families with chil-
dren or with a higher propensity to marry or have children. This pathway is
also a complementary one, because it relies on migration as related to local
welfare provision. We computed two relevant indicators: immigrants and
emigrants among 0–4-year-old children and immigrants and emigrants
among 15–49-year-old women.We then computed an indicator relating im-
migrants and emigrants and used a logarithmic transformation.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between Islamic governance in a prov-
ince center and the provincial-level economic, religious, immigration, and
infant mortality outcomes. The ﬁgure shows that local Islamic governance
has no signiﬁcant causal effect on subsequent unemployment rates. Thus,
the ﬁrst necessary condition of an explanation of the causal effect of Islamic
rule through an economic pathway is rejected. Local Islamic governance
does seem to have an effect on Quran course completion rates, however,
but only among women (for women, RD estimate 5 10:89, cluster robust
SE 5 6:44, two-sided P 5 :09 for the optimal bandwidth of .13, with1329
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wFIG. 8.—Causal effect of Islamic governance in the province center on potential province-
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Political Islam, Marriage, and FertilityN 5 180; for men, RD estimate 5 2:69, SE 5 :80, two-sided P 5 :39). Is-
lamic governance in the province center does not have a signiﬁcant causal ef-
fect on net child immigration (RD estimate 5 20:263, cluster robust SE 5
1:70, two-sided P 5 2:122 for the optimal bandwidth of .11), on net immi-
gration among fertile women (RD estimate 5 20:123, cluster robust SE 5
1:11, two-sided P 5 :244 for the optimal bandwidth of .18), and on infant
mortality (RD estimate 5 1:488, cluster robust SE 5 0:988, two-sidedP 5
:132 for the optimal bandwidth of .20). In fact, although insigniﬁcant, the
effects of Islamic governance on net child immigration and infant mortality
are negative and positive, respectively. The directions of these insigniﬁcant
effects are against the alternative explanations of the positive effects of Is-
lamic governance on marriage and fertility we document in this article.
Figure 9 shows, using our individual-level data set, the relationship be-
tween local Islamic governance and individual measures of religiosity and
the ideal number of children. As apparent from the ﬁgure, we do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcantRD effect on the ideal number of children or on the individual
measure of religiosity.
As discussed above, although Islamic governance does not have an effect
on individual religiosity, it seems to have an effect on Quran course comple-
tion rates at the province level. We now consider the other necessary condi-
tions for the two alternative pathways, namely, the path fromunemployment
and Quran course completion to marriage and fertility. For this purpose, we
ﬁt a series ofmultilevel regressionmodels with random effects at the province
level, to predict GFR andmarriage rates from 2009 to 2014. Table 2 presents
the results of these models. Each model includes dummy variables for years,
with 2009 as the reference category. We also include a random slope for the
linear time trend (t 5 year 2 2009) per model. Each model in table 2 is a
“compound symmetry model,”with a random slope for time, which is a typ-
ical model for longitudinal data (Snijders andBosker 2012, chap. 15).We do
not regress fertility and marriage on net immigration and infant mortality
because these latter two measures are, by construction, related to the two
dependent variables.
The models in table 2 also include dichotomous controls for east and
southeast Anatolia and logged and centered province population as control
variables. Models M3, M6, andM9 include a dummy variable that indicates
whether the province center was won by the AK Parti in 2004. The models
also include one-year laggedmeasures of the unemployment rate and the pro-
portion of men and women who completed the TPRA Quran courses. The
lagged measures rather than the current measures are included because the
currentmeasures of these time-varying independent variables would be highly
endogenous to the outcome variables.
All models indicate a decreasing trend in fertility andmarriage over time.
However, this trend is experienced differently in different provinces; that is,1331
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Allthe variance of the slope of the time variable (s1) is statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, the correlation between the slope of time and province-level ran-
dom effects (s01) is negative and signiﬁcant. This indicates that provinces
with initially high fertility andmarriage rates experience a steeper decrease.FIG. 9.—Causal effect of Islamic governance in the province center on individual-level
mediators TDHS-2013: ideal number of children and religiosity. Includes local polyno-
mial smoothers (thick lines) with gray lines as conﬁdence intervals. Local linear RD point
estimates for KI optimal bandwidths, their robust SEs, and two-sided P-values are in-
cluded below each panel.1332
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Political Islam, Marriage, and FertilityMore important, however, the unemployment rate in a previous year is not
associated with fertility andmarriage in a given year. This rules out the sec-
ond necessary condition for a potential pure economic pathway.
There is a positive and signiﬁcant effect of the Quran course completion
rate among men on both male and female marriage rates. The female course
completion rate has no effect on any of the dependent variables. We should
note that there is nomulticollinearity betweenmale and female Quran course
completion rates (correlation coefﬁcient is only .40). These results show that
while an increase in male religiosity may increase marriage, it does not have
any effect on fertility. Moreover, it is female religiosity, not male religiosity,
that is causally inﬂuenced by local Islamic governance. In addition, recall
that there is no effect of local Islamic governance on individual-level mea-
sures of religiosity. Consequently we conclude that the religiosity pathway
does not account for the causal effect of local Islamic governance onmarriage
and fertility. Interestingly, the dummy indicator of the AK Parti rule in 2004
is statistically signiﬁcant inM3,M6, andM9.While the effect sizes inM6 and
M9 are similar to the RD estimates reported above (also see ﬁg. 6), the effect
size in M3 is smaller compared to the RD estimate for the effect of local AK
Parti rule on GFR.
The province-level data on annual fertility andmarriage rates enable us to
test whether the causal effects of Islamic rule on our core independent var-
iables vary over time.While we ﬁnd that the effect on fertility decreases over
time, this decrease is very small and statistically insigniﬁcant (interaction
effect 5 2:06, SE 5 :04, P 5 :198). But, the effect of Islamic governance
onmale and female marriage rates does decrease signiﬁcantly between 2007
and 2014. For every year, the effect decreases by 0.36 (SE 5 :136, P 5 :010)
for the male marriage rate and by about 0.32 for the female marriage rate
(SE 5 :152,P 5 :039). Recall that the original effect sizes were 3.82 formale
marriage rates and 4.41 for femalemarriage rates. These effect sizes represent
an average between 2007 and 2014, approximately centered around 2010.
We can then calculate roughly (assuming a constant rate of decrease) that
the effect of Islamic governance on marriage will completely disappear by
about 2020.CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We tackled the long-standing question about the relationship among poli-
tics, religion, and family by focusing on a strategic research site: Turkey at
the turn of themillennium,with the rise of the AKParti into power.We built
three complementary data sets, linking demographic, economic, and social
data at the subnational level with election results. Using an RDD, we
showed that local Islamic (AK Parti) rule in 2004 has had a positive and sig-
niﬁcant causal effect on fertility and marriage propensities in subsequent1333
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Allyears. Our RDD compares the districts in which the AK Parti barely won
with the districts the AK Parti barely lost. The districts on the two sides of
the winning threshold are expected to be very similar in all observed and un-
observed covariates, except for having a local Islamist mayor. In fact, we
show that districts just below or above the winning threshold are indistin-
guishable when a number of important covariates including fertility rates
and marriage prevalence before the elections are considered. Hence, our de-
sign implies a natural experiment inwhich an Islamicmayor is as-if randomly
assigned to districts.
To explain these effects, we point to the massive wave of socioeconomic
assistance the AKParti has launched, which is distributed via local author-
ities, combined with a discourse that favors more traditional family behav-
iors and explicit pro-natalism. This socioeconomic assistance has targeted
young families, mothers, and in general the poor. A number of analyses are
consistent with this hypothesis. Our results are robust to alternative spec-
iﬁcations of the RDD and are consistent across data sets. With additional
data and analyses, we also exclude the possibility that the causal effect of
local Islamic governance on marriage and fertility behavior is explained by
economic development, by an increase in religiosity, by welfare migration,
or by improvements in infant health.
There might be other potential mechanisms that we could rule out, if we
had appropriate data. For example, the victory of the AK Parti in a district
may have created an optimism about the future among its citizens, perhaps
mainly among themarginalized Islamic circles. This optimism, in turn, may
have resulted in more marriages and a higher fertility. Testing and identi-
fying all potential causal pathways leading fromAKParti rule to higher fer-
tility and marriage is beyond the scope of one article.
Our study contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, from a
political sociology perspective, it shows the signiﬁcance of the deployment
of strategic demography and local welfare policies. Strategic demography
is signiﬁcantly intersecting with the religious identity of Turkey’s AK Parti.
Our ﬁndings emphasize the importance of the role institutional and struc-
tural factors play, as opposed to individual norms and values, in shaping
the link among religion, politics, marriage, and fertility. Second, from a so-
cial policy perspective, it shows the effects of a pro-natalist policy through
local welfare provision onmarriage and fertility, in an alla Turcamodel that
is very different from pro-natalist strategies deployed in traditionalWestern
democracies. The effects are somehow similar to Swedish pro-natalism but
in a completely different setting and in a fashion that is designed to be com-
patible with the neoliberal agenda of the AK Parti. Third, from a demogra-
phy perspective, we described themechanisms throughwhich Turkey’s fer-
tility transition halted at the replacement level, rather than shooting toward1336
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Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertilitythe much lower levels of its southern European neighbors or Iran. Fourth,
our analyses showed the potential of RDDs in answering sociological ques-
tions and also in addressing the mechanisms behind the causal effects.REFERENCES
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